Abstract-This paper proposes and demonstrates the novel application of a secure wireless sensor network for roadside surveillance and vehicular detection using radio tomographic imaging. Network architecture is based on the well-established Zigbee standard and medium access is provided through a time division multiple access scheme. Wireless security vulnerabilities are considered and a four-part security scheme is presented. Field test results are provided to validate both the baseline radio tomographic imaging functionality and the accompanying wireless sensor network security mechanisms.
INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) offer the potential to increase data collection or processing capabilities across a broad range of applications for a minimal investment of manpower. A WSN typically consists of some number of wireless sensor nodes each comprised of a power supply, a processor, a radio transceiver, and a suite of applicationdependent sensors. WSNs are frequently employed to implement a "smart environment" or to gather data over a given area [1] . Examples of such networks include fully interactive home electronics systems [2] and meteorological survey WSNs used monitor simple weather indicators over a region [3] as well as military applications such as remote battlefield monitoring [4] and signals collection [5] .
This work proposes the novel application of wireless sensor network radio tomographic imaging (RTI) to provide secure remote roadside surveillance. This wireless sensor network provides the capability to securely and autonomously monitor vehicular traffic along roadways by detecting and identifying passing vehicles using radio tomographic imaging. With application to both the military and civilian sectors, it can provide remote surveillance of enemy combatant movement as well as monitoring and management of traffic flow on major commuter arteries.
The main contributions of this work are (1) the novel design and implementation of a roadside surveillance WSN using RTI to detect and identify vehicular traffic and (2) the design and implementation of an accompanying wireless security system. Design constraints are considered and field results are provided to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed network. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation and successful field test of a secure wireless sensor network roadside surveillance application using radio tomographic imaging. This paper is organized as follows. Background discussions in the areas of Radio Tomographic Imaging and WSN security are provided in Section II. The design and operation of the RTI-capable WSN is presented in Section III and the accompanying security scheme is proposed in Section IV. The results from two field tests are provided in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
In this section, we present a summary of the important points related to Radio Tomographic Imaging and Wireless Sensor Networks security.
A. Radio Tomographic Imaging
While many techniques exist for roadside surveillance and the accompanying localization and tracking functions, there are a number of significant drawbacks in the existing proposals. Image-based positioning requires a camera to have an unobstructed view of the object and good illumination conditions [6] . RF direction-finding techniques require the object to have an active transmitter and multiple receivers that cannot be subject to jamming or interference [7] , [8] , [9] . GPS requires a clear, unobstructed view of the sky and the ability to track multiple satellites, conditions which can easily be degraded in forest or indoor environments [10] .
Radio tomographic imaging (RTI), developed by Wilson and Patwari [11] , provides a means for localizing and tracking the position of an object inside a sensor network. RTI operates by using a wireless sensor network in a fully-interconnected mesh configuration where each node monitors the received signal strength from every other node. As objects move into the network, they will physically obstruct one or more links. Links that are obstructed will experience losses due to reflection, diffraction, and object attenuation. As a result, the received signal strength (RSS) on those links will decrease relative to a pre-calibrated or previously measured baseline free space value. By monitoring which links are attenuated and by how much, it is possible to determine the position, size, and mass of the object in the network [12] . Additionally, objects that are actively broadcasting a jamming signal may still be roughly located simply by monitoring which links have been jammed. By evaluating links that are being jammed and those that are not, the network is able to determine the approximate source of the jam field and track the object [13] .
B. WSN Security
As WSNs are deployed more commonly and deal increasingly with sensitive, private, or mission-critical information, the need for WSN security grows correspondingly. The development of WSN security is influenced by the distinguishing traits of WSNs: limited processing capabilities, a finite power supply, and deployment in remote locations to function autonomously. Thus, the security concerns relevant to WSNs differ from those of traditional wireless networks.
Threats to WSNs can be divided into external and internal attacks. External attacks can be further sub-categorized as passive attacks, which typically consist of unauthorized listening, or external attacks, which usually take the form of a denial of service attack involving some variety of jamming or power exhaustion. Internal attacks consist of the infiltration of the WSN by a foreign node, or the corruption and compromise of an existing sensor node within the network [14] .
Potential attacks on WSNs include jamming, tampering, intended collision, energy-exhaustion, flooding, node desynchronization, and spoofed, altered, or replayed routing information. Areas of concern in WSN security can be summarized as cryptography, key management, attack detection and prevention, secure routing, secure location, secure data aggregation, security-energy assessment, data assurance, and survivability [14] .
III. SENSOR NETWORK DESIGN
We now describe the wireless sensor network used in this work and the layout of its nodes. Additionally, we provide a description of networked RTI operation.
A. Sensor Platform
The RTI sensor network is comprised of a number of wireless sensor nodes and one aggregate control node. The hardware of every node is fundamentally the same. The command and control (C2C) node, though, is programmed with different software code. A schematic of the circuit board used is shown in Figure 1 . This circuit board features a battery power source, microprocessor, and XBee ZigBee Pro RF module, as shown in Figure 2 . Nodes use the DSPIC33FJGP302 microprocessor, which is configured to interface with the XBee module. In transmissions, the XBee is set to use Advanced Peripheral Interface (API) mode to ensure easily recognizable packet formats.
B. Operation
The network collects data by measuring the RSS of packets sent between nodes. Nodes transmit sequentially in a Time Division Medium Access (TDMA) scheme initiated by a start packet broadcast by the C2C node, which synchronizes all the sensor nodes. A single scan of the network begins with this start packet, and each sensor node is allocated one time slot in the scan. Within its respective time slot, each node broadcasts a packet to the network that includes both its identity (node number) and the most recent RSS values it has recorded from the prior scan (one for each other node in the network). The remaining nodes in the network listen for this transmission, and measure and record the RSS value of the packet received. Figure 4 illustrates one such transmission taking place. At the completion of the scan, each node will have knowledge of the most recent signal strength between itself and every other node in the network array.
During each scan, the C2C node will send the start packet and then listen to the nodes' transmissions for the remainder of the scan time. Because each node broadcasts its data packet to the entire network, an additional listening node configured for monitoring purposes is able to receive and record the RSS information in real time. This node is an XBee RF Module, connected to a PC via RS232, which is able to observe and record all RSS information using a capture text program. The resulting data can be used to piece together a three dimensional picture of any impeding object in the area within the network [11] .
One limitation of the network is the speed at which it can detect objects moving through the network. This speed is limited by the length of time it takes to perform a single scan of the network area. In turn, the scan time is ultimately determined by the XBee data rate and amount of information sent in each packet. For a linear network configuration, such as one that might be used to monitor vehicle traffic along a road [13] , [15] , it is critical to be capable of accurately tracking vehicles moving at typical highway speeds. Figure 3 illustrates the format of the data packet used in our network, which is typical of the packet format used in a RTI WSN system. The time required for one scan of the network is given by b its s c a n r a te
where bits k is the total number of bits which need to be transmitted in a single scan, rate n is the rate at which data is transmitted in bits/second, and scan t is the amount of time in seconds required for a full scan of the network to occur. To account for the time needed by a node to process each packet, the value ( / ) bits rate k n represents a lower bound for scan t . In a linear configuration, the minimum desired object resolution will be inversely proportional to the maximum speed of the vehicle, as given by
where dist r is the voxel size, and det v is the maximum movement velocity in meters/second at which objects moving through the network can be detected. The area scanned by the network is divided into some number of voxels. The voxel length is related to the resolution of images produced from the network's RSI data, and represents the desired minimum resolution in meters for detecting objects. This value influences the velocity at which objects moving through the network can be determined, since an object cannot be detected if it exits a given voxel before a single scan can be completed.
The network implementation presented in this work was designed as a sample proof of concept and uses the following specifications: det s = 10 mph = 4.704 m/s, dist r = .75 m, rate n = 9600 bps.
IV. SECURITY
As discussed in Section II, a number of security vulnerabilities exist in the baseline WSN that need to be addressed to ensure robust operation. For example, the unsecured RTI wireless sensor network design is vulnerable to RF jamming attacks, covert node replacement, false data transmission, and transmission tapping by unintended listeners. In this section we discuss the design and implementation of security solutions to these vulnerabilities.
The security scheme presented here consists of four components, listed below. A functional decomposition is also shown in Figure 5 .
Message Encryption:
The network implements an encryption protocol to ensure secure and private transmission of network traffic.
Jamming Mitigation:
The network is configured to minimize the effects of jamming (i.e. malicious noise or interference in the transmission channel) on network operation.
Network Topology:
The control node is able to detect the presence of nodes dropping off of and rejoining the network.
Node Authentication:
If a new node joins the network, the control node initiates a 'Challenge-andResponse' confirmation to ensure that the node is authorized to be on the network. This list of security features is not exhaustive since we have limited our work to a subset of commonly targeted security vulnerabilities. These specific vulnerabilities were chosen because they address the fundamentals of network security [16] . A good example of potential follow-on work is the network's ability to withstand energy depletion attacks. 
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A. Jamming Mitigation To provide Jamming Mitigation and minim outside noise and interference, we make use hopping scheme. This design utilizes a fre scheme in which the network cycles throu different frequencies without regard to whe signal is present. This is a proactive approach benefit to this design is that the overhead identifying the presence of interference can comes at the expense of a slight increase in sc complexity. An alternative design utilizing a would periodically measure the channel f jamming signals and would only initiate fre when such a signal was found. Although the provides a lower overhead cost to network op of channel switching when channel noise is no task of adaptively coordinating the XBee n channel after each hop in an order and frequ during runtime adds significant complexity to t
The XBee RF Modules incorporate 16 channels across which chips are preconfigu Channel frequencies are described by the equat 2.405 GHz (
where c f is center frequency, and CH repres number (ranging from 0x0C to 0x17). Channe non-overlapping. In other words, XBee modu different frequencies are not able to commu transmissions do not interfere with each ot implementation, all nodes switch transmi simultaneously, according to a prearranged practice, the hopping sequence can also be g the use of a pseudo-random sequence kno authorized nodes [18] .
B. Transmission Encryption
To protect the privacy of the information e WSN operation, we implemented a Transmi scheme designed to encrypt network data pack The XBee RF Modules include suppo (Advanced Encryption Standard) 128-bit sym solution was selected because it meets requirements of this work and can be directly any XBee-based network. This decreases net though, as each data packet must append an ad of overhead and each message encryption or d slight processing delay. In our network, the add increased the average packet length by rough this result will vary for different network desig
To secure the network from unaut surveillance, all nodes operating on the netw using a single main KY (encryption key) val the symmetric key for encrypted network traff management issues (which are beyond the in this work), we chose to limit the keys used to set. All nodes are set to Encryption Enabled loaded with the predetermined KY valu mize the effects of e of a frequency equency hopping ugh a series of Figure 6 . These p except in select circumstances (as ou
C. Network Topology
The goal of the network topolo scheme is to track the addition and exiting the network. For this ap designed to run using a fully connec with a central controller and is not capabilities.
The diagram in Figure 7 outlin that determines how the control during the RSS transmit loop. A no the network if it consecutively mis during) some set number of netwo observes the network across each sc nodes do not respond within their a to the TDMA scheme. The control n each sensor node within the networ whenever the associated node suc some predetermined maximum, an node fails to do so, down to a mi node's counter reaches a value of z network and is marked accordingly node begins retransmitting after some absence, recognizes that node as a new, unauthenticated join the network and implements a Node Auth as described in Section D, before recogniz trusted once more.
The underlying RTI network design infl approach this problem. Due to the TDMA unauthorized nodes attempting to fully infilt will need to occupy a time slot previously authorized node which has dropped off the ne network topology scheme is intended to track nodes and the addition of unverified nodes to th Although this system increases the amoun for the control node to recognize the disappe from regular network traffic, it also allows s network interference. If a node misses one or t transient noise or ambient interference, th accounts for that slight break in transmissions able to remain within the network as an author
D. Node Authentication
To protect the network against infiltra entities, we have designed a Node Authentica works in conjunction with the Network Topolo
The solution used in this work is a Response' scheme which is triggered whene joins the network. State diagrams for both for and for a sensor node requesting authenticati Figure 8 . The challenge and response schem decrease in network throughput since it req normal network operation to perform each che
The Challenge-and-Response sequence is 
Control Node
, the control node d node seeking to hentication check, zing the node as fluences how we scheme utilized, trate the network y vacated by an etwork. Thus, the k both the loss of he network.
nt of time needed arance of a node some leeway for two cycles due to he control node s, and the node is ized entity.
ation by outside ation scheme that ogy solution.
'Challenge-andever a new node r the control node ion are shown in me causes a slight quires a pause in ck.
triggered when a new node joins the network. Thus and Network Topology schemes functionality and implementation. scheme detects the presence of a n sets an internal flag which initialize scheme.
The control node pauses netw beginning of the next cycle and sen in question indicating the beginn Response routine. If the control acknowledgment (ACK) from that n times out and determines the node Should the control node receive an within the set time frame, both nod encryption key in order to ensure s procedure also serves to leverage th scheme as an additional identity che Once both nodes have switche the control node will use a nonce authenticity. A nonce is simply a ran of bytes which the sensor node i receive from the control node's e return. The control node then sends indicating successful receipt of its m return to the main network KY set results of the Challenge-and-Respon will broadcast a message to the n oncoming node has been authentica control node and all authenticated regular network activity.
ne showing logic for Node Authentication in Control and Sensor Nodes. 
V. IMPLEMENTATION RESUL
In this section, we discuss the methodolog two field tests conducted to verify implement functionality of the RTI wireless sensor netw detection capabilities and the associated described in Section IV.
A. RTI Functionality Test
To collect information on the baseline fun RTI WSN, the project team conducted an 18 n the network in the parking lot of the Nav Memorial Stadium. The purpose of the field te the RTI network operation and verify that it distinguishing between dissimilar vehicle profi Nodes were set up in two parallel rows w 10 meters between rows. There was a sepa between each node in a row. A control node an were stationed at either end of the network. T used for the test, a large utility van and a smal both shown in profile at the top of Figure 9 .
The test itself consisted of taking RSS read at three positions within the network. Addit were taken of the test vehicle moving through slow speed. These tests were repeated for bo and electric car. Data was later processed in M algorithm described in the work of Martin et al Shown in Figure 9 is a side by side compar tomography profile created by the utility van respectively, at different points within the ne provides clear differentiation between the two validates the sensor network's primary objectiv 
B. Security Functionality Test
A second test was organized to of the network security system. Sam on the Jamming Mitigation, Netw Authentication schemes.
Testing took place in a lab sett WSN in order to simplify network fu smaller network size was sati identification capabilities were not c the higher resolution of a larger Separate tests were conducted for e nodes programmed with code spec scheme.
Testing on the Network T consisted of deactivating and react the network was running to simulate entering the network. These checks of one, two, and three nodes at a ti network was recorded through a lis used to verify that the control no identify both a sensor node drop an node to the network. Out of 15 succeeded in correctly detecting deactivations and activations. Figur the test results. The results presen ability to identify sensor node depar the network. It should be noted that discovered that one of the XBee unexpected condition which, af reactivating the node, caused the expected delay in data transmission never noticed by the control node a the absence of this issue, our result higher success percentages.
Testing of the Node Authenticat using a similar methodology. In this nodes were configured to implemen code including predetermined pu portion of the sensor nodes were pre the remaining nodes were pre-as recorded network traffic data was us node's ability to correctly distingui ility van (left) and k. 
Nodes Dropped Number of Sensor Nodes
Correctly Detected De o verify the implementation mple testing was performed work Topology, and Node ing using a smaller 6 node functionality for testing. The isfactory, since vehicular considered in the testing and network was not needed. each security scheme using cifically for that respective Topology implementation tivating sensor nodes while e nodes dropping off of and s were performed in groups ime. The data output of the stening node. This data was ode was able to accurately nd the entrance of a sensor 0 trials, the control node g 88.7% of both node re 10 shows a summary of nted here indicate a robust rtures from and entrances to following these tests it was e modules was set in an fter powering down and node not to experience an . Thus, the sensor node was as having been dropped. In ts would have yielded even tion scheme was conducted s battery of tests, the sensor nt the Node Authentication ublic and private keys. A e-assigned valid keys, while ssigned invalid keys. The sed to verify that the control ish between authorized and ology scheme implementation. ting the network detected by the of node detections expected.
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d Nodes Activated tections Expected unauthorized nodes. Out of over three hundred trials, 99.0% of the authorized nodes entering the network were correctly identified, and 100% of the unauthorized nodes were correctly identified. The test results are summarized in Figure 11 . Our results indicate that the implemented Challenge-and-Response based Node Authentication scheme is capable of protecting network integrity against unauthorized nodes, even when multiple nodes are entering and exiting the network simultaneously.
The Jamming Mitigation security scheme was tested by recording network traffic for a predetermined length of time while we simulated broadband jamming across a number of channels. The jamming signal was created using an Agilent ESG-D signal generator transmitting an FM modulated signal at 19 dBm (the XBee RF modules are capable of transmitting at up to 18 dBm). The network was configured to frequency hop across three of the available preset channels and network traffic was recorded while jamming was present across zero, one, and two channels respectively. Listening nodes were configured to monitor all 3 active channels simultaneously.
Implementation efficiency was evaluated based on resulting network throughput, as measured by the ratio of the number of active links and packets received versus the expected number of active links and received packets. A link was considered inactive if it was reported by a node as being dropped (i.e. the node was not able to determine an RSS value for that link during the previous scan) or if the data packet in which the link would have been reported was dropped. As anticipated, the resulting throughput of this test decreased in direct correlation to the number of channels jammed, as shown in Figure 12 . The total number of packets dropped as a function of time was also recorded through the jamming mitigation tests. Figure 13 shows these recorded values under each of the tested jamming conditions. Using these figures, we observed that there was a linear correlation, which remained constant across time, between network throughput and the intensity of jamming present (i.e. the number of channels experiencing jamming). The number of dropped packets in each test can be referenced against the ~3800 total data packets expected to be received across the course of each test.
In low noise environments, the frequency hopping scheme operates effectively without dropping an excess number of packets. Although only three channels were used in our sample tests, our results indicate that limited signal interference could be effectively overcome by utilizing a larger number of active channels.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed and fielded a secure Zigbee-based wireless sensor network capable of vehicular detection and identification using radio tomographic imaging. The RTI WSN is comprised of readily available components and is easily configured. The network is capable of distinguishing between distinct vehicle profiles and can be used in a number of public safety, military, or commercial applications.
Field results indicate that our design is capable of maintaining network functionality despite moderate noise interference and is resistant to a number of common network infiltration attacks. This design is applicable to any similar ZigBee-based WSN utilizing a central controller. Furthermore, the principles of our implementation could reasonably be used to increase the network security resilience of any WSN configured in a mesh network topology with a central controller. Figure 11 . Number of sensor nodes properly authenticated upon activation using implemented Node Authentication scheme. Divided into categories of authorized and unauthorized sensor nodes. Figure 12 . Throughout measured byreceived data packets and number of active links using implemented Jamming Mitigation scheme under varying levels of interference. No Jamming One Channel Two Channels
